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Abstract. This paper examines ethics in finance, specifically related to responsible 
investment. In recent years, socially responsible principles are becoming the de facto 
standard not only for socially responsible but also for profitable investing. For instance, 
the United Nations developed the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) in 2006, 
which require institutional investors to incorporate ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance) issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes. This raises 
the following question: can responsible investments be justified from an ethical point of 
view? In this paper I first explain responsible investments. Then, I turn to the ethical 
foundation of responsible investments. There are two arguments for responsible 
investments. I argue that both fail. Therefore, my conclusion is that the ethical 
foundation of responsible investments is not firm. 
Keywords: Ethics in Finance, PRI, Responsible Investments, Evil-Company Principle, 
Conscientiousness. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines ethics in finance, specifically related to investors. In 
recent years, socially responsible principles are becoming the de facto standard not 
only for socially responsible investing (SRI) but also for profitable investing. This 
phenomenon raises the following question: can responsible investments be justified 
from an ethical point of view? In this paper, I first explain responsible investments. 
Then, I turn to the justification problem. There are two arguments for responsible 
investments and I argue that both fail. Therefore, my conclusion will be that the 
ethical foundation of responsible investment is not firm. 
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2. RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS 
What are responsible investments? I will give two examples: Principles for 
Responsible Investment (PRI) and Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa 
(CRISA). Afterwards, I will explain their relation with the issue of ‘ethical’ investments. 
2.1. THE PRINCIPLES 
In 2006, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI). The principles require institutional investors to 
incorporate ESG (Environmental, Social and Corporate governance) issues into 
investment analysis and decision-making processes. 
 
PRI
1
 
Where consistent with our fiduciary responsibilities, we commit to the following: 
 
1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-
making processes. 
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership 
policies and practices. 
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which 
we invest. 
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within 
the investment industry. 
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the 
Principles. 
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing 
the Principles. 
 
Over 1900 investment institutions signatories comprising of asset owners, 
investment managers and service providers (May 7, 2018) signed on to these six 
principles for responsible investment
2. In 2015, Japan’s Government Pension 
Investment Fund (GPIF), the world’s largest pension fund of approximately 137.5 
trillion yen, joined the PRI. 
What are ESG issues? Environmental issues include climate change, 
deforestation, and water risks. Social issues cover human rights, working conditions 
and modern slavery. Governance issues involve tax avoidance, executive pay and 
corruption. Thus, investors who are PRI signatories will assess how companies are 
managing their water risks in agricultural supply chains. 
 
1 Principles for Responsible Investment: https://www.unpri.org/about (accessed May 7, 2018).  
2 Signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment: http://www.unpri.org/signatories/ 
signatories/ (accessed May 7, 2018). 
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Another example of Responsible Investment is the Code for Responsible 
Investing in South Africa (CRISA), released in 2010: 
 
CRISA
3
 
1. An institutional investor should incorporate sustainability considerations, 
including environmental, social, and governance, into its investment 
analysis and investment activities as part of the delivery of superior risk-
adjusted returns to the ultimate beneficiaries. 
2. An institutional investor should demonstrate its acceptance of ownership 
responsibilities in its investment arrangements and investment activities. 
3. Where appropriate, institutional investors should consider a collaborative 
approach to promote acceptance and implementation of the principles of 
CRISA and other codes and standards applicable to institutional investors. 
4. An institutional investor should recognise the circumstances and relationships 
that hold a potential for conflicts of interest and should proactively 
manage these when they occur. 
5. Institutional investors should be transparent about the content of their 
policies, how the policies are implemented, and how CRISA is applied to 
enable stakeholders to make informed assessments. 
 
The principles also require institutional investors to incorporate ESG issues 
into investment analysis and investment activities. 
2.2. ‘ETHICAL’ INVESTMENTS? 
The presence of responsible investments raises the following issues. (1) Do 
responsible investments pay? (2) Are they compatible with the fiduciary duties of 
trustees? (3) How should we  measure ESG factors? (4) Which factor is the most 
important? (5) What is the relation between responsible investments and ethical 
investments? 
When it comes to the last question, Russell Sparkes, a fund manager in the 
UK, explains that SRI was known as ‘Ethical Investing’ in the UK, but was 
replaced with ‘Socially Responsible Investing (SRI)’ for two reasons: “[I]n the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition, “ethics” is generally seen as something individual, about 
personal values’, so ‘it makes less sense to describe a pension fund: there is “an 
apparent contradiction of using the word ‘ethical’ to describe profit-maximising”4. 
This might be also why they use the word ‘ESG issues’ rather than ‘ethical’ issues 
in responsible investments. 
 
3 ICGN（The International Corporate Governance Network): https://www.icgn.org/sites/ 
default/files/South%20African_Code.pdf (accessed May 15, 2016). 
4 Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2002), pp. 357-367. 
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One might ask whether ESG issues are relevant to ethics. Aiko Kozaki and 
Masato Takebayashi from the Japan Research Institute conducted a comparative 
analysis of KPIs for ESG and ISO26000, showing that labor practices, environmental 
issues, fair operating practices, and consumer issues are ESG factors, but that 
human rights and community involvement and development are not
5
. Their 
analysis, however, raises only the current issue of KPIs for ESG; it does not show 
that ESG issues are irrelevant to ethics. 
Thus far, I have analyzed responsible investments. Let us now consider the 
ethical foundation in responsible investments.  
3. THE ETHICAL FOUNDATION 
Can responsible investments be justified from an ethical point of view? In 
this section, I present two arguments for responsible investments. One is an 
argument from consistency: consistency requires that if you believe that companies 
are engaged in wrongdoing, then you must not invest in those companies. The 
other is an argument from the ‘evil-company principle’: it is wrong to invest in 
companies that are engaged in wrongdoing, whether you believe it or not. I argue 
that both arguments fail. 
3.1. CONSISTENCY 
The most common argument for responsible investments is the appeal to 
consistency. For instance, Amy Domini, an American investment adviser, makes 
this appeal:  
“There are two basic reasons for integrating social or ethical criteria into the 
investment decision-making process: the desire to align investments with 
values and the desire to play a role in creating positive social change. 
Consistency is almost always the motivation that causes investors to start down 
the path of becoming socially responsible in their investments”6.  
Richard T. DeGeorge argues that “[c]onsistency requires that if one believes 
that making and selling cigarettes is unethical, then one is ethically required not to 
own stock in such a company”7. We can present this appeal to consistency as an 
argument: consistency requires that if you believe that companies are engaged in 
wrongdoing, then you must not invest the companies; you believe that a certain 
 
5 Aiko Kozaki and Masato Takebayashi, “Domestic and International Situation and Analysis 
on ESG Investments”, Securities Analysts Journal, 49(5): 8-18, 2011, p. 14.   
6 Amy Domini, Socially Responsible Investing: Making a Difference and Making Money (Fort 
Lauderdale: Kaplan Publishing, 2001), p.13.  
7 Richard T. DeGeorge, Business Ethics (London: Pearson, 2013), p. 271. 
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company is engaged in wrongdoing; therefore, you are justified not to invest the 
company.  
There are two examples of the inconsistent investor
8
. The first is teetotalism. 
It might be considered inconsistent for someone who practices and advocates 
teetotalism to hold shares in a brewery. The second is the British Medical 
Association: it was subjected to criticism because, while it had an anti-smoking 
policy, it held shares in companies that had substantial tobacco interests. 
Joakim Sandberg, however, objects to this argument
9
. What is inconsistency? 
He sees at least five interpretations of inconsistency: logical inconsistency, 
arbitrariness, practical inconsistency, some error of instrumental rationality, and 
hypocrisy of pretense
10
. He argues that under any interpretation, it would be 
permitted to change your belief that companies are engaged in wrongdoing in order 
to avoid the blame of inconsistency
11
.  
He then proposes an appeal to a more comprehensive conception of 
‘conscientiousness, or moral seriousness’12. This is an argument that a person who 
does not invest in companies you believe are engaged in wrongdoing is a 
conscientious (morally serious) person and that a person who invests in those 
companies is morally frivolous. A conscientious person would not change her 
belief that companies are engaged in wrongdoing in order to avoid the blame of 
inconsistency. However, Sandberg points out the conscience of Huckleberry 
Finn
13. For Huck, it is against his conscientiousness to assist another man’s slave to 
escape. It is Huck’s weakness of will that leads him to do the right thing. Sandberg 
suggests another type of position: 
“What do these examples show? ... Perhaps we should simply give up on the 
appeal to conscientiousness, and say that some form of objectively obviously 
is needed.... We might call this the objectivist position. Most philosophers who 
have discussed issues in connection with ethical investing actually seem to 
assume this type of position”14. 
In a footnote, Sandberg refers to Irvine
15
 and Larmer
16
 as holding the 
‘objectivist’ position. I agree with Sandberg that the argument from consistency 
 
8 Chris J. Cowton and Joakim Sandberg, “Socially Responsible Investment”, in Encyclopedia 
of Applied Ethics, (New York: Elsevier, 2012), p. 146.  
9 Joakim Sandberg, “Should I Invest with Conscience”, Business Ethics: European Review, 
16(1): 71-86, 2007.  
10 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
11 Ibid., pp. 77-78.  
12 Ibid., p. 76.  
13 Ibid., p. 80.  
14 Ibid. 
15 William B. Irvine, “The Ethics of Investing”, Journal of Business Ethics, 6(3): 233-242, 1987.  
16 Robert Larmer, “The Ethics of Investing: A Reply to William Irvine”, Journal of Business 
Ethics, 16(4): 397-400, 1997.   
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fails. It should be noted, however, that conscientiousness is a virtue and 
frivolousness is a vice. The example of Huckleberry Finn might suggest that we 
should focus on his other virtues
17. Let us now turn to the ‘objectivist’ argument. 
3.2. THE EVIL-COMPANY PRINCIPLE
18
 
Many people may hold that it is wrong to invest in an ‘evil company’, as we 
do here. According to DeGeorge, “[t]he general principle is that if a corporation is 
established for an immoral end, then no one can morally support its activities 
through the purchase of its stock”19. William B. Irvine calls this the ‘evil-company 
principle’20. We can formulate this principle as follows: it is wrong to invest in 
companies that are engaged in wrongdoing, whether you believe it or not. This 
seems to be intuitive enough. 
Irvine, however, argues against it by giving the following counterexample. 
We first imagine an evil company, XYZ Company, which uses slave labour to 
manufacture products that cause horrible deaths. One day, the president of XYZ 
Company comes to you and announces that he has seen the error of his ways, and 
promises that if you buy a certain amount of his company’s stock, his manufacturing 
process will no longer require slave labour, and he will stop manufacturing harmful 
products. In this case, Irvine claims that it is not wrong to buy the stock, and thus 
rejected the evil-company principle. 
Irvine then proposes what he calls the ‘enablement principle’, according to 
which, “[i]t is morally wrong for a person to do something that enables others to do 
wrong”21. Thus, even if I do not invest in an evil company, it is morally wrong as 
long as my investment enables others to do wrong
22
. 
He seems to assume a consequentialist argument: it is wrong to fail to 
produce the best consequences; investing in an evil company fails to produce the 
best consequences; therefore, it is wrong to invest in the evil company. He seems to 
reject the second premise: investing in an evil company can produce the best 
consequences. I agree with him on this point. It is an empirical matter, but we can 
 
17 Nomy Arpaly argues that the example of Huck shows our ‘unprincipled virtue’. For more 
details see Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). Tommi Juhani Lehtonen emphasizes caring of institutional investors in 
“Philosophical Issues in Responsible Investment: A Care-ethical Approach”, Social Responsibility 
Journal, 9(4): 596-598, 2013.  
18 I examined the evil-company principle elsewhere (Sugimoto [forthcoming]). This discussion 
is a sequel to that examination. 
19 DeGeorge, Business Ethics, p. 271.  
20 Irvine, “The Ethics of Investing”, p. 234.  
21 Ibid., p. 236.  
22 Irvine does not accept this formulation of the enablement principle, and modifies it (Ibid., 
236-241).  
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easily imagine a shareholder activism which brings about change in an ‘evil 
company’. However, his example is misleading. Robert Larmer points out that if 
Irvine’s example is a counterexample of the evil-company principle, it must be the 
case not only that XYZ Company was formerly an evil company, but also that it is 
presently an evil company, which is open to dispute
23
.
 
 
Even if it produced the best consequences, it might be wrong for other 
reasons. Cowton and Sandberg make a deontological argument: it is incorrect to 
profit from the wrongdoing of others; investing in an evil company means profiting 
from the wrongdoing of others; therefore, it is wrong to invest in that evil company. 
Irvine seems to reject the first premise. He calls it the ‘tainted-profits principle’, and 
argues against it by giving the following counterexample
24
. Suppose that there is a lot 
of burglary incidents in your neighborhood. You can profit from this wrongdoing. 
You might go into the guard business, the insurance business or the tool business. 
However, if you open such a business, you would not do anything wrong. 
The second premise is also dubious
25
. It is not necessarily true that investing 
in an evil company amounts to profiting from its activities. Furthermore, investors 
profit from their investment when they sell shares. Most of us do not think that 
selling undesired shares is worse than holding them. 
Cowton and Sandberg also present the other deontological argument, what 
we might call the ‘complicity’ argument: it is wrong to invest in an evil company 
because the investors support the company
26
. Cowton and Sandberg argue that to 
the extent that investors are buying and selling shares on the stock market, the 
investors are actually not engaging with the underlying companies directly. Even if 
the investors do not support an evil company financially, they may do it 
symbolically. Cowton and Sandberg also argue that this is not necessarily so. 
There is another possible way to interpret this ‘complicity’ argument. We can 
take the case of an investor who invests in an evil company as literally as 
‘complicity’ is understood. Suppose that the ABC Company uses slave labour to 
manufacture products that cause horrible deaths. The president of ABC Company 
promises that if you buy a certain amount of his company’s stock, he will use more 
slave labour to manufacture more products. You decide to buy the stock. In this 
case, you are engaged in wrongdoing. However, again, this is not necessarily so. 
Therefore, the argument from an ‘evil-company principle’ fails. 
 
23 Larmer, “The Ethics of Investing: A Reply to William Irvine”, p. 398. Larmer claims that 
the enablement principle presupposes the acceptance of the evil-company principle and shows that 
what is morally desirable is not to do something that enables others to do wrong, but to do something 
that enables others to do wrong with evil intent. He argues, therefore that the enablement principle 
requires the evil-company principle (Ibid. p. 399-400). 
24 Irvine, “The Ethics of Investing”, p. 236.  
25 Cowton and Sandberg, “Socially Responsible Investment”, p. 147.  
26 Ibid. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Can responsible investments be justified from an ethical point of view? In 
this paper, I examined two arguments for responsible investments, and argued that 
both fail. My conclusion is that the ethical foundation of responsible investments is 
not firm. 
REFERENCES 
Arpaly, Nomy. Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
Cowton Chris J., and Sandberg, Joakim. “Socially Responsible Investment”, in 
Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, New York: Elsevier, 2012. 
DeGeorge, Richard T. Business Ethics, London: Pearson, 2013. 
Domini, Amy. Socially Responsible Investing: Making a Difference and Making Money, 
Fort Lauderdale: Kaplan Publishing, 2001.  
Irvine, William B. “The Ethics of Investing”, Journal of Business Ethics, 6(3): 233-242, 
1987.  
Kozaki, Aiko and Takebayashi, Masato. “Domestic and International Situation and 
Analysis on ESG Investments”, Securities Analysts Journal, 49(5): 8-18, 2011.  
Larmer, Robert. “The Ethics of Investing: A Reply to William Irvine”, Journal of Business 
Ethics, 16(4): 397-400, 1997.   
Lehtonen, Tommi Juhani. “Philosophical Issues in Responsible Investment: A Care-ethical 
Approach”, Social Responsibility Journal, 9(4): 596-598, 2013.  
Sandberg, Joakim. “Should I Invest with Conscience”, Business Ethics: European Review, 
16(1): 71-86, 2007. 
Sparkes, Russell. Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution, New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2002.  
Sugimoto, Shunsuke. [Forthcoming] “Investor Ethics: From SRI to Principled Investments”, 
Proceedings of the Sixth International Society of Business, Economics, and Ethics 
(ISBEE) World Congress [in Chinese]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was originally delivered at the Japan Society for Business Ethics ESG Investing 
Division Meeting in Tokyo, March 2018. The work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant 
Number JP16K16691. 
